‘Majority Met Legal Criteria’ …Justice Minister Delivers Opinion On S/Court’s Ruling

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The Ministry of Justice says that majority members of the House of Representatives met the constitutional requirements as explicated by the Supreme Court to hold sessions and take decisions consistent with the laws of the Country and the Rules of the House of Representatives.

In a seven-page reply to Minister of State Sylvester Grisgby’s request to the Justice Ministry to deliver an official legal opinion of the Government of Liberia on the recent ruling of the in the impasse of the House of Representatives, Justice Minister Oswald Tweh said that the budgetary process can be legally carried out by the majority members provided they meet the same standards laid out by the Supreme Court’s opinion, and that any decision therefrom is constitutional, legal and valid.

Minister of State Grisgby wrote the Justice Minister December 7, 2024 requesting an opinion on the implications of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court, handed down on Friday, December 6, 2024, in the case: “in re The Constitutionality of Several Actions taken by Certain Members of the House of Representatives”, with  specific reference to the submission of the 2025 Budget to the Legislature for legislative passage and approval, seeking a Legal Opinion on how the Government may proceed in light of the Opinion and Judgment of the Supreme Court and as to how the Court’s Opinion affects the process of approval of the Budget by the Legislature.

“It is in light of that perspective that I provide this Legal Opinion, the Opinion of the Minister of Justice and in providing this opinion, we have reviewed and are relying on the following: 1. The Constitution of Liberia, adopted in 1984, which came into effect on January 6, 1986, and amended thereafter. 2. The Opinion and Judgment on the Supreme Court delivered on December 6, 2024. 3. The Rules and Procedure s of the House of Representatives,” Justice Minister Tweh said.

He said It is relevant to note that the Court acted on a portion of the request of the Petitioners; that is, prior to its final determination of the matter, the Court granted the request to order a stay and for all parties to return to status quo ante.

The Justice Minister said it’s his reading of the Court’s silence on this matter in its opinion that the parties obliged accordingly. On the contrary however, the Court did not pass on the other requests of the petitioners or declare any of the actions complained of unconstitutional or illegal as they did not meet the Court’s standard for determination, as was the case with placing the stay order, saying that the Court opined that “it need not pass on every issue raised in a bill of exceptions or the briefs filed by the parties, but only those that are germane to the determination of a case.”

He said the Court was clear that as to those issues which related to the several requests made or the prayers of the petitioners, it did not believe that they were germane to the disposition of the matter before it which can legally be said to be a denial of the requests.

The minister said the first issue which the court deemed important to address was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition before it. The Court determined that it had jurisdiction to determine the controversy between the two parties- the crux of that legal determination:

“In my opinion, based on precedents, the court rightly determined that it had the authority to hear and determine the petition. The second issue which the Court felt was germane to the determination of the case was “what is the interpretation of Article 33 and Article 49 of the Constitution.” Having identified the issue, the Court then made several observations on the procedures for legislative hearing, including in particular, obtaining a quorum, which is the essence of Article 33 of the Constitution. On that issue, the Court was clear and emphatic and laid out the criteria and elements on how a legislative sitting is constitutional and legal. My observation, from a reading of the Supreme Court’s Opinion, is that the Court laid down four criteria or conditions as the foundation for any sighting of the Legislature to be constitutional and legal. The four conditions are:

  1. A quorum must be present; 2. The Presiding Officer must have taken the Chair; 3. The Sergeant-At-Arms shall cry the commencement of the day’s Session; 4. Thereafter, the Chaplain shall offer prayers,” Minister Tweh said.

Minister Tweh: “In both instances, the Court was clear that a simple majority constituted a quorum for the transaction of business. Here is how the Supreme Court framed its position on the issue:” it is our opinion that the framers of the Constitution in crafting the Article 33 set a simple majority as the quorum for the transaction of business in anticipation that not every single member of House of Representatives would be present at every sitting of the House of Representatives; that there would be instances where some members of the House would be absent from work due to personal, health or official reason; and that the work of the House will not be stalled due to the absence of a few members.”

Thus, he said, under the authority of the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of the House of Representatives, quoted by the Court, the Speaker could not convene a session for the conduct of business of the House since there was never a simple majority quorum present for the conduct of such business. On the other hand, the majority membership sitting, having exceeded the simple majority required by the Constitution and the Rules of the House, clearly met the criteria set out by the Constitution and the Rules of the House for a quorum. Therefore, the majority membership satisfied the criteria laid out by the Court.

“It is further important to note that the Court did not address any issue of venue, and I believe correctly so, since the Constitution itself does not prescribe a particular venue for the members of the House of Representatives to meet for Session; to do so, in the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution, I believe, would have inhibited any Session being held in the event the particular venue was not available for any number of reasons. Nor is there any provision in the Constitution that a majority of the members of the House of Representatives must assemble where the Speaker is. They could assemble at any venue as deemed convenient for the conduct of business and the 33 of the Opinion, the Court quoted the relevant part of Articles 33 of the Constitution, as Speaker would be at liberty to preside over such a meeting or, in his absence, the Deputy Speaker is clothed with the authority to preside at the meeting,” Minister Tweh said.

On the second question as to whether there was a Chair available, the justice minister said his findings are that there was a Chair and that the Deputy Speaker, as the Presiding Officer at the majority quorum prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of the House of Representatives, did take the Chair, given the absence of the Speaker.

He said In the instant case, at the meeting of the quorum required by law, the Presiding Officer was the Deputy Speaker, the Speaker not being available or present where a majority of the House membership had assembled for the conduct of business.

“This is how the Supreme Court quoted the Rules of the House in support of the necessity of a session or the process leading to a legal session being conducted of the House, presided over by a presiding officer, a quorum being present for the conduct of business,” the opinion of the justice minister said.

The minister said he is of the considered legal opinion that a quorum level having been met for the transaction of business, and the Court having said that, per the Constitution, the Speaker shall preside at the meeting, and in his absence the Deputy Speaker shall preside, and the Deputy Speaker being present at the meeting whereat there was a quorum, and in the absence of the Speaker at such meeting at which a quorum was present, he, the Deputy Speaker, could legally and constitutionally preside over the meeting for the transaction of the business of the House, pending the Speaker joining the meeting if he so desired.

Justice Minister Tweh said to take an opposite position would mean that the House could not hold any meeting as long as the Speaker was absent, no matter how near he may be within the vicinity of the meeting of the House where a quorum was present for the conduct of business. “I do not believe that the framers of the Constitution could have envisioned that the House would be prevented from conducting business although it had a quorum simply because the Speaker decided, for whatever reason, that he would not attend the meeting. I am also of the Legal Opinion that not only was such a view not within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution, but that to subscribe to such view would mean that a Speaker could absent himself or herself from a quorum meeting of the House indefinitely, although just nearby (few yards or a room away from the meeting venue), and there could be no transaction of business of the House for the entire term of the House,” the opinion stated.

Minister Tweh said the Supreme Court did not subscribe to such theory, for it recognized that where a quorum is present and the Speaker is absent, the House can proceed with its business under the gavel of the Deputy Speaker, and such a situation was within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution.

Tweh said he does not believe that the framers contemplated that the Speaker, because he is stated as a presiding officer, could insist that the quorum of the House membership should sit where he sat or a meeting, although having the constitutional quorum, would not be held except at a place designated by him, adding that neither the Constitution nor any statute should be interpreted in such a manner to lead to absurd outcomes, and that this too may have motivated the Court to espouse that actions by and parties running contrary to Articles 33 and 49 are ultra vires.

“I am of the further Legal Opinion that the other two criteria set out in the Supreme Court’s Opinion were met and hence, that the sitting of the majority quorum of the House was legal and constitutional. I am informed that at each sitting of the majority constituting the quorum of the House, the Sergeant-At-Arms was present and cried the commencement of the day’s Session; and further, that not only was the Chaplin of the House present but that he offered prayers after the crying of the commencement of the day’s Session. If in such circumstances, the Speaker elected not to be present at the majority quorum of the House, it was legal and as provided for both by the Constitution and the Rules of the House, for the Deputy Speaker to preside over the meeting and the business of the House at such meeting,” the justice minister said in his opinion.

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